Albania and Turkey did not act in overtly irredentist ways towards their ethnic brethren in neighboring states after the end of communism. Why nonetheless Albania facilitated the increase of ethnic conflict in Kosovo and Macedonia, while Turkey did not with respect to the Turks of Bulgaria? I argue that kin-states undergoing transition are more prone to intervene in external conflicts than states that do not do so, regardless of the salience of minority demands in the hoststate. The transition weakens the institutions of the kin-state. Experiencing limited institutional constraints, self-seeking state officials create alliances with secessionist and autonomist movements across borders alongside their own ideological, clan-based and particularistic interests. Such alliances are often utilized to advance radical domestic agendas. Unlike in Albania's transition environment, in Turkey there were no emerging elites that could potentially form alliances and use external movements to legitimize their own domestic existence or claims.
Introduction
Research on ethno-national violence in countries emerging from communism has largely focused on elite or group-based dynamics or on the role of the international community. The impact of kin-states has been discussed either in the context of the large-scale violence that This article argues that kin-states undergoing transition from totalitarian rule are much more likely to facilitate the rise of ethno-national conflict in host-states than kin-states experiencing no transition, regardless of the salience of the minority demands in the host state.
Albania, which underwent transition, did not intervene in the internal conflicts in Kosovo and Macedonia because of a clearly expressed irredentist agenda, but in line with the following logic:
As a state undergoing transition, Albania was much more prone to support the principle of national self-determination externally as the latter affected other countries from the communist bloc. In addition, it was exposed to dual pressures stemming from the international community, on the one side, and its own need for domestic reform on the other, both weakening its state institutions over a short period of time. Experiencing limited institutional constraints, selfseeking state officials created alliances with secessionist and autonomist movements across borders alongside their own ideological, clan-based and particularistic interests. As a result, Albania exhibited a Janus-faced foreign policy. Officially, it gave in to the pressures exerted by the international community to maintain a non-interventionist stance. Unofficially, it pursued an interventionist agenda to various degrees. By contrast, a kin-state that did not undergo transition, such as Turkey, was less likely to intervene in the conflicts in the host-state. It was cautious about supporting self-determination abroad. Also, since there was no need for rapid domestic reforms, Turkey did not become vulnerable to strong international pressures, and could maintain a level of institutional strength that would allow it to formulate and implement a coherent foreign policy on the national question. Unlike in Albania's transition environment, there were no emerging elites in Turkey that could potentially utilize external secessionist and autonomist movements to legitimize their own domestic agendas. The paper is structured as follows. First, I discuss the degree to which existing theories explain the empirical puzzle. Second, I explore the process by which Albania's dualistic attitude increased the level of internal conflict in Kosovo and Macedonia. Third, I look at how Turkey intervened in the majority-minority relations in Bulgaria without increasing the level of internal conflict. I conclude by discussing future avenues for research.
Theoretical Accounts and the Empirical Puzzle
In the three cases examined only the actions of the Kosovo Albanians can clearly be classified as 'secessionist'. After Kosovo's autonomy was forcefully abolished by Milosevic in 1989 Albanian deputies secretly adopted the "Kaçanik" Constitution, and declared Kosovo a republic within Yugoslavia. When Yugoslavia started collapsing in 1991 and there was no longer a state in which Kosovo could become a federal republic, a Kosovo-wide clandestine referendum legitimized its independence. In contrast, the Albanians of Macedonia actively sought territorial autonomy. They boycotted the adoption of the new Macedonian constitution in 1991, and organized a clandestine referendum on autonomy of Western Macedonia in 1992. During the most intense fighting in 2001 both Albanians and Macedonians raised claims about the territorial division of Macedonia, yet their demands subsided after the end of the violence. On their part, the Turks of Bulgaria sought primarily non-territorial solutions. While during the assimilation campaign of the 1980s they raised claims for autonomy, during the 1990s such voices existed, but were rare and marginal.
How would theories on irredentism interpret the positions of Albania and Turkey?
Weiner's classical model, derived from the interwar period and highlighting the formation of inter-state alliances across borders and the popular-based incentives for the redemption of ethnic brethren, is weak in addressing the puzzle related to the 1990s (1971: 670-682) . After the end of the Cold War neither Albania nor Turkey started forming inter-state alliances to redeem ethnic brethren abroad, although the international system changed from bi-polar to multi-polar and provided grounds for increased regional instability. Neither were there popular incentives to aid the struggle abroad. During communism Albania was highly isolated from the entire eastern bloc, thus the connections between Albanians in Albania proper and those in former Yugoslavia faded away over the decades (CEDIME-SE, 2002) . Similar dynamics were observed between the Turks in Turkey proper and those in Bulgaria, divided by a thick Iron Curtain: Bulgaria was a staunch supporter of the Soviet Union and Turkey was a NATO member.
Theories about the international system allow us to better understand Turkey's and Albania's behavior in the 1990s. As Ambrosio argues, the nature of irredentism has changed from the era of nation-state formation (late 19 th -early 20 th c.), when pressures for boundary changes came from 'within' the irredentist states. In the second half of the 20 th c they came from external secessionist movements (2001: 20-21) . The lack of overt irredentism could possibly be explained by Horowitz' dictum that 'foreign policy goals [of an irredentist state] can be achieved better by encouraging secessionist movements…than by encouraging irredentism ' (1991:10-11) .
Also, the kin-states experienced constraints by a post World War Two international legal principle of respect for territorial sovereignty, and by the actual resistance of the international powers to legitimize secessionist movements in defense of this principle. While these explanations account for existing domestic and international constraints, they still do not explain why Turkey acted with more constraint than Albania.
Other theories highlight domestic motivations. Defeated in wars in the early 20 th century, the two kin-states could have learned that irredentism is too costly. They could act in line with common affective, instrumental, and structural factors facilitating external intervention. 1 Albania clearly supported the Kosovars and Albanians of Macedonia because of national affinity, but also because it was relatively easy to do so as the ethnic brethren was located in compact areas right across the Albanian border, which is also highly porous. By contrast, the Turks of Bulgaria were concentrated in two areas, not in one, and the borders were highly guarded. Also, as kin-states that are ethnically diverse, they may feel vulnerable that secessionism can spring from within their own diverse population should they aid secessionism abroad (Carment and James, 1997: 194-231 My own explanation builds on two accounts that seem unrelated at first glance. On the one hand, Ganguli argues that a kin-state may pursue a strategy of 'inaction' towards its ethnic brethren because of its own lack of capabilities, funds, and cost-benefit calculations (1998:11-31 The right to national self-determination resurfaced as a political principle with the regime changes at the end of the Cold War (Heraclides 1990 , Moore et al. 1998 , Bianchini and Schöpflin, 1998 , Bunce 2005 . At the time when Albania -a laggard in its transition process as of 1991 -was pressured by events in former Yugoslavia to take a stance on Kosovo's selfdetermination, countries in the post-communist world had already exercised this right. Germany had unified in 1990, and former Yugoslav republics and successors of the Soviet Union had declared independence in 1991. Prompted by an international demonstration effect rather than by the resurgence of internally driven territorial revisionism, Albania followed suit. It was only a day before the ratification of Kosovo's bid for independence in September 1991 that Albanian Foreign Minister Muhammed Kapllani used the words "Republic of Kosova" for the first time addressing the UN General Assembly (Kola, 2003:222 Albania. Shortly after he won office, he also spoke of Kosovo's right to self-determination (Jenne, 2007:171) . He argued that the Kosovo Albanians should be entitled to holding free democratic elections as did other break-away regions of former Yugoslavia (Kola, 2003: 206-207, 222, 282) . Engaging Kosovo's self-determination in an election campaign was surely a symptom of Berisha's searching to utilize a foreign cause for his particularistic purposes. Such a stance is also typical for a transition process, where the changing rules of the game in an uncertain environment create a window of opportunity for such action.
Why Albania did not advance irredentist claims? Apart from the fact that it followed events in Eastern Europe in terms of timing, there are other reasons. The above-mentioned geopolitical separation among Albanians during communism accounted for the lack of an emotional salience of the pan-Albanian appeal. Thus, the national question -although ranking high on Albania's foreign policy agenda -did not supersede another goal, obtaining external support for Albania's own democratization (Kola, 2003) . Clearly, instrumental reasons trumped affinitive ones. Geopolitically, Albania wanted to change spheres of influence and become a future member of Western institutions, the European Community and NATO. Economically, its problems deepened as of 1990, and necessitated foreign aid. Its own weakness increased its susceptibility to strong international pressures in order to achieve its priority foreign policy goal.
The international pressure intensified once a local counterpart -Berisha's government elected in 1992 -was available to engage with. Since this government maintained a pro-Western orientation, a dialogue on policy change was easier than with the previously ruling unreformed communists. In order to get through serious internal political and economic reforms, Albania became a subject of stringent international control and conditionality. Politically relevant actors, such as the United States and the EU and international financial institutions linked economic aid and promises for political benefits and membership with requirements for democratization and market economy, respect for minority rights, and maintenance of peace and security in the region. Thus, pressures on Albania to reconsider its initial enthusiasm for the Albanian selfdetermination intensified. Already in 1992 German Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher promised to enlist assistance to Albania while urging Tirana to act in consensus with the principles of inviolability of borders (Kola, 2003: 231) . Also, during negotiations at international conferences Tirana was urged to accept a 'minority rights approach' towards the political demands of the Albanians of Kosovo and Macedonia. Such approach clashed particularly with the Kosovars as they consider themselves 'people' with a right to territorial self-determination.
Signs that the pressure worked stem from 1993 when Berisha abandoned overt calls for Kosovo's independence and came up with the idea of 'democratic space in the Balkans' to facilitate regional integration into Europe regardless of international borders (ibid, 309).
While the transition process allowed international actors to impose on Albania an official non-revisionist stance, the same transition unleashed further dynamics that weakened the state institutions and often worked in the opposite direction -a de facto support of self-determination movements albeit unofficially. Forging an alliance across borders, Berisha consulted Kosovo leaders on political strategy, supported their appeals on international forums, concluded economic agreements, and repeatedly warned that Albania would not idly stand by in the event of war in Kosovo (Biberaj, 2000 : 246, Zanga, 1992 . During Berisha's tenure the democratic cleavage was reinforced by a regional/tribal one, as he derived his support primarily from a Gheg constituency living in the North and belonging to the same cultural/regional subgroup as the Albanians of former Yugoslavia. In contrast, the Albanian Socialists who succeeded Berisha in government drew their constituency from the South where the people are predominantly Tosk (Blumi, 1998: 527-569 ).
The Socialists in government were not so excited about Kosovo and developed mixed policy stances. In 1991 the post-communist government of Ramiz Alia fluctuated between restricting itself to polemics against the curtailment of Kosovo's autonomy and the actual support for Kosovo's independence (Zanga, 1992: 23 ). This meeting not only failed to improve Albanian-Kosovo relations, but for a long time thereafter the Albanian government solicited information about ideas on Rugova's mindset from foreign diplomats and the media rather than through direct contacts (Lani, 1998 (Cota, 2000) . Former KLA commander Ramush Haradinaj gave more detail about these operations. As of 1991 he started buying hand grenades, small bombs, and pistols all intended for use in Kosovo, then studied closely the army, police and 'other services', and established connections with people who could help 'at the appropriate time.' In 1996 he 'employed former and serving officers of the Albanian Army in order to train soldiers and help find routes for moving military equipment' (Hamzaj, 1999: 14-15) . According to Serbian accounts, the primary training camps were in a village near Tirana and in three settlements close to the Yugoslav-Albanian border (Pike, 1999) .
As the rebel-police collisions intensified in 1996, support for the KLA became more obvious in Albania: large numbers of guerillas were seen training in the most northern Albanian highlands, and rejuvenating in clubs in Tirana (Vickers, 1995: 32) .
Porous borders are another major indicator of a weak state, if we follow the lead of Max
Weber's emphasis on statehood deriving from the legitimate use of violence over a given territory. Activities across porous borders facilitated the growth of Kosovo's secessionism.
Against the backdrop of increasing unemployment the borders opened opportunities for the uninhibited flourishing of smuggling businesses. A 'hot spot,' the border point Qafa I Prusht between Kosovo and Albania became well known for the trafficking of women for prostitution (Wennmann, 2005 : 479-494, 485, Corrin, 2004 . In addition, the mountainous terrain impeded the proper working of regular patrolling. Yet evidence suggests that Albania was not interested in imposing strict controls on this border. As early as 1992 when the EC wanted to dispatch CSCE monitors on the Albanian-Yugoslav border, Albanian foreign minister Marku fiercely resisted. Dispatching observers would have meant the creation of a de facto buffer zone formalizing a division of the Albanian nation (Kola, 2003: 261) . Moreover, until the end of January 1998 military hardware necessary for defense purposes was negligible alongside this border (Vickers, 1995: 32) .
The final point of weakening of state institutions came in 1997 when sham financial schemes, flourishing with the knowledge of the Berisha government, consumed the life-time savings of more than half of Albania's population and caused in return demonstrations, looting, anarchy and the breakdown of the state (Nickolson, 1999: 553-555) . During the anarchy, mobs stole around 650,000 weapons and other military items from the local armories (Hedges, 1998) .
Many of them were directly smuggled into Kosovo, while others were purchased by militants later. In mid-1997 a single Kalashnikov was sold for five US dollars (Judah, 2000: 116, 127) .
The collapse of the state managed clearly to shift the military balance in Kosovo. In addition,
Berisha -feeling vulnerable due to the collapse of his regime together with the state -resumed a nationalist rhetoric. He joined a bandwagon of critics of the non-violent movement in Kosovo, and accused Rugova of passivity (Jenne, 2003: 173) .
To sum up, a complex causal chain was triggered by the transition process in terms of changing attitudes towards self-determination, making Albania's foreign policy highly could have used this window of opportunity to take an irredentist or a pro-secessionist stance.
Instead, Albania was one of the first states to recognize Macedonia without reservations regarding its constitutionally proclaimed name, Republic of Macedonia (Perry, 1992: 39) .
Moreover, Albania recognized Macedonia quickly, realizing that any scenario entailing territorial divisions would have immediate repercussions on Albania and on the Albanian minority living there (Reuter, 1995: 95) . A swift reaction at a point of time when Albania was not experiencing strong international pressures on the national question, unlike later, demonstrates that it did not have any irredentist ambitions.
Albania's official foreign policy towards Macedonia was again close to the agenda of the international community. Shortly after becoming a president in 1992, Sali Berisha met his
Macedonian counterpart Kiro Gligorov and signed a declaration of intent to create a 'model' relationship between the two countries (Perry, 1992: 39) . Unlike his attitude towards Kosovo, Berisha considered the inter-ethnic relations in Macedonia a subject of consideration of the Macedonian state and gave no serious encouragement of the national aspirations of the Albanians (Gowan, 1999 ). Albania's support for a clandestine referendum on a territorial autonomy in Macedonia in 1992 was also lukewarm. In line with the 'minority rights approach'
Berisha backed statements of the Albanian party in power (the Party for Democratic Prosperity, PDP) about misrepresentation of population numbers and insufficient respect for human rights.
He also stated that in the case of war, Albania would come to assist its ethnic brethren (Thayer, 1999: 131-219, 134 ).
An argument for clear-cut ideological ties across borders and despite an official foreign policy line cannot be made with the same salience here as in the Kosovo case. Yet similarities exist. From 1994 onwards Berisha became increasingly supportive of some radical elements within the ruling PDP, who were discontent with the lack of progress of inter-ethnic relations in
Macedonia and de facto participated in 'ethnic outbidding' (Horowitz, 1985) . In ideological terms these factions were nationalist, but in terms of how they related to the old post-communist order, they were challengers. These factions of the PDP were trying to outbid the core of a party whose many cadres had been ruling in various capacities in communist Yugoslavia. In this vein one can see why Berisha would be interested to support challengers, who opened a parallel Tetovo University in 1995, intending to provide Albanians with higher education despite the resistance of the Macedonian state. Berisha praised the self-proclaimed rector Fadil Sulejmani, a move that temporarily strained his relations with the government in Skopje.
In contrast, the response of the socialist Fatos Nano towards the 1997 crisis in the 
Turkey: Calculated Support for the Turkish Minority in Bulgaria
The end of the Cold War exposed both Albania and Turkey to external pressures for change, as the international system was no more bi-polar and the two states needed to find their place in a new international order. In addition to that, Albania had to undergo various changes related to its transition: from isolation to Western orientation, from totalitarianism to political pluralism, and from command economy to market pluralism. It was exposed to a 'triple transition' which Offe called the reconfiguration of relationship to statehood, political pluralism, and towards a market economy (1991:865-881) . In contrast, Turkey needed a strategic reconfiguration of its foreign policies in a multi-polar world order, but did not undergo drastic domestic changes associated with a transition process. Turkey had developed a strong sense of statehood with the formation of the First Turkish Republic in 1923 under the secular leadership of Kemal Attatürk. Its transition towards political pluralism started in the mid-1950s and has been ongoing since (Sunar, 1996: 141-153 (Dodd, 1996 : 135, Fuller, 1993 . Yet none of these changes took place in a drastic way, but more as a result of gradual processes. As a result, the state institutions, functioning despite occasional strong disagreements with the highly autonomous military (Özcan, 2001 (Özcan, : 14, Sunar, 1996 The integration of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria was taken seriously for two primarily realist reasons. First, Turkey needed to curb immigration. It was overwhelmed by the need to permanently accommodate more than 250,000 Turkish refugees who refused to return to Bulgaria after the regime change. Second, Turkey sought to minimize its external flashpoints due to security concerns over its borders in the East (conflicts in Armenia and Azerbaijan), the Southeast (the Kurdish problem) and the formation of a Kurdish-controlled zone in northern Iraq after the Gulf War (Perry, 1992 : 33, Nahmani, 2003 . Thus, rapprochement with Bulgaria was desired. Turkey backed the integrationist Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) and refrained from developing close ties with a radical Turkish formation which advocated autonomy and constitutional changes. 4 The point here is that there were no political circles in Turkey that would identify the autonomy question as a frame for local mobilization, and would not support a possible ethnic outbidding, as we saw happening with Albania in both Kosovo in 1996 and Macedonia in 1994 A non-interventionist stance was enhanced by Turkey's preference for focusing relations directly with the mainstream Bulgarian politicians rather than via the leadership of the Turkish minority. This was not the case of Albania neither with Kosovo, nor with Macedonia, despite its respect for the territorial integrity of the Macedonian state. Central to this dynamic was a leadership issue. Bulgarian media often alleged that MRF's leader Ahmed Dogan had collaborated with the communist regime. Thus, it took a special effort to convince Turkish diplomats that he could be trusted in the post-communist environment (Minchev, 2002) Turkic and Islamic groups should not be overstated (Winrow, 2001: 181) . For example, the highly controversial Islamic movement "Gülen" maintained a low profile in Bulgaria, despite its much stronger support for Turkic minorities in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Even in Central Asia, the movement's ethnic sensitivities and national loyalties superseded Islamic frames for mobilization (Turam, 2004: 354) . This suggests that although Turkey's pluralistic society may These findings have implications on future research. First, it would be useful to consider expanding the universe of cases of kin-states in the 'gray zone' -when they are constrained by international conditionality, but nevertheless act in support of secessionist and autonomist movements. States that do not have a chance to become an EU member and to be subjected to a rigorous scrutiny of how they handle national and minority questions during an accession process (unlike Hungary, Slovakia or Bulgaria) could be cases in point. Russia reluctantly intervened to support the Russian minorities in the Baltics, but was more assertive in Moldova.
South Africa -despite a non-interventionist foreign policy after the end of apartheid -has been supportive of the white minority protests in Zimbabwe. My findings imply that international pressures imposed on a country during a transition -which pervades as a political process in the world today -does not necessarily prevent it from taking a pro-secessionist and pro-autonomist stance. Further studies could explore how this intervention interacts with the weakening or strengthening of the domestic institutions, which are critical for the further deterioration of conflict. It may well be the case that international pressures during transition periods weaken state institutions as drastic changes take place during a limited period of time. Like Albania, Turkey was experiencing international constraints by NATO or its own aspirations to become an EU member. Yet these constraints had been exerted gradually: for four decades politically, and since the mid-1980s economically and in terms of aspirations towards joining the EU.
Gradualism favored incremental changes that did not additionally weaken the state institutions. 1 Common instrumentalist explanations include: superpower interests and neo-colonialism, political and economic gains, internal politics, and military reasoning (Heraclides, 1990 (Heraclides, : 341-378, 1991 ). Saideman's 'ethnic ties' account maintains that states support those actors in the host state with whom their own constituency shares ethnic ties and oppose those with whom their own constituency shares ethnic enmities (1997: 721-753, 2001: 1-11) . Affective perspectives include: historic injustice, common identity, religion, a shared sense of injustice or principle, a degree of inchoate racial-cultural affinity and humanitarian considerations. (ibid 371, Carment, 1993: 139) . Structural considerations include: relative power of competing states, existence of common institutions among divided societies; size, concentration and dispersal of people involved, porousness of borders (Chazan, 1991: 4) . 2 The literature on transitions of post-communist countries is large, yet on aspects related to challenges of various democratization pressures on the state -'triple' or 'quadruple' -consult: Offe 1991 , Schmitter and Karl 1994 , Bunce 1995 , Linz and Stepan 1996 , Kuzio 2001 I use Rotberg's operationalization of strong and weak states, based on governance criteria. Strong states control their territories, deliver political goods and civil liberties to their citizens and perform well on indicators related to good governance. In contrast, weak states usually face management flaws, harbor conflicts, and their governments' adequacy to deliver political goods is diminished. Laws are breached and corruption levels are high. (2004: 4-5) . The appendix to this article offers a comparative statistical data on the performance of Albania and Turkey throughout the research period on: GDP per capita, control of corruption, government effectiveness, and the rule of law. 4 The Turkish Democratic Party (TDP), not officially registered in Bulgaria, raised occasionally demands for autonomy. It insisted that a Grand National Assembly be called to adopt a new constitution that would 'fit the international requirements for multi-national states' (Program Declaration, 1992) .
